Abstract

Since the convening of the Austrian Historical Commission in 1998, the state of scholarly literature is all but unanimous: the classification of Austria as a victim collective was clearly at odds with historical reality. Where the preponderance of literature to this point has concentrated on deconstructing the Austrian victim myth, this paper analyzes its creation and the political exigencies which allowed it. It further characterizes the victim myth, not as the vindication, but rather as the creation of an Austrian Nation. This paper approached the question through two sets of sources; first, documents concerning Austria meant for the public; decrees, propaganda, and the like. Second, it examines the process through the classified orders and communique of political and intelligence officers, military personnel, and diplomatic officials. While this paper makes use of long public Western sources, it was not until somewhat recently that Soviet archives became available, so this is amongst the first works to have Soviet perspective on Austria’s role in the war and later political struggles.

Austrian political identity in the wake of the Habsburg collapse was fluid: a popular referendum to unify with Germany passed overwhelmingly in 1919, but was blocked by the Allied Powers, who did not want to see a German resurgence. The Great Depression only deepened the crisis, so that “to all but a handful, the idea of an independent Austria was simply inconceivable.” Even after unification with Germany, American, British, Soviet, and Austrian elites all viewed Austria as a politically malleable state. In early 1943, the British Ministry of Information first proposed the Moscow Declaration, promising Austrians lenient treatment, should they aid in the Allied advance.

After the collapse of the Nazi regime in 1945, Austria was split into American, British, and Soviet zones of control. To avoid exploitation and a more vigorous denazification—which was seen as a likely pretext for permanent Soviet or American involvement—the Austrians began producing documentary “proofs” of victimhood, the most famous of which is the *Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch*. As Cold War tensions began to heighten, the Austrian public and the Provisional Government, fighting to avoid reparations and a second humiliating guilt clause, consolidated themselves more firmly behind the *Opferdoktrin*—the victim doctrine. The Soviets and the Allies could not refute the *Opferdoktrin*. In the first place, it effectively nullified the threat of a
future German reunification, which remained a concern in post-War politics. Additionally, while competing for influence in Austria, neither the Americans nor the Soviets wished to take a more aggressive stance and risk alienating the Austrian populace. As a result, the *Opferdoktrin*, while shielding Austrian Nazis and collaborators, opened a path to independence and neutrality for the Austrian people. Furthermore, in identifying with the myth of a resilient, but deeply wronged Austria, the previously apathetic Austrian populace was provided with a desirable corporate identity, which shielded them against repercussions and crowned them with the laurels of tragic heroism.

**Bibliographical Note**

In writing this paper, the author drew on a variety of sources. The topic of Austrian history being somewhat outside the mainstream in English speaking countries, the author did the preponderance of his research in the original German. The document sources used in this paper might be split into those intended for public consumption, and those which most certainly were not. In the first class was a series of documentary histories, compiled and published by the Austrian Provisional Government during the Allied occupation, which sought to prove Austrian innocence in World War II; the exemplar of this genre being the *Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch*, published by the state press in 1946. Other public sources included speeches drawn from prominent figures, various government declarations and accords, laws passed within the individual allied zones of control, and a series of public discourses between Austrian and Soviet officials on the fitness of Austria to govern itself. Among the sources not intended for public consumption were the personal papers of the chief American and British diplomats in Austria, American, British, and Soviet orders and reports dealing with denazification and the reapportionment of the German Eigentum, Soviet directives to the KPÖ (Communist Party of Austria), orders from Soviet military commanders, as well as the analyses and reports of Soviet political officers on the ground. In most cases, the author was able to find topic specific volumes of compiled documents related to his theme, which, with the addition of the online database and archives managed by the University of Innsbruck Institut für Zeitgeschichte, allowed him to perform a reasonably thorough investigation of his subject. Exciting though they are, the author could not have read the recently released Soviet documents in the original Russian, so a note of special thank goes out to Wolfgang Müller et al for their compilation *Sowjetische Politik in Oesterreich, 1945-55: Dokumente aus russischen Archiven*, and to Stefan Karner and Barbara Stetzl-Marx for their *Die Rote Armee in Österreich: sowjetische Besatzung, 1945-1955*, without which this would have been a far less intriguing—and less satisfying—project. The secondary literature on this subject is remarkably rich, and had seen a strong resurgence in the last twenty years. Of special note here are Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka, whose prolific—not to say voluminous—and thoughtful treatment of Austrian historical identity and whose fearless challenges to the idols of popular memory proved essential to this paper.
Christopher A. Reilly

Title: Failure in Somalia: Conditions, Decisions, and Apathy That Led to a Failed State
Faculty Advisor: Dr. James Toole (Political Science)
Paper written for: POLS Y397: Intervention, Peace and War (Fall 2013)

Christopher A. Reilly was born in Chicago, IL in 1991 but has lived practically his entire life in Decatur, IN. Upon graduating from Bellmont High School in 2010 he went to Basic Training as a member of the Indiana Army National Guard. He spent his first semester at IPFW, in the spring of 2011, as a Criminal Justice major, but switched to Education in the fall. Over the last three years several professors have made his studies in history and political science an interesting and rewarding experience. In particular, Professor James Toole helped him grow an intense interest in the study of international relations, which is where this paper got its beginning. Upon graduating in May of 2015 Christopher will have B.S. in Education, his teaching license, and will be a commissioned officer in the National Guard. He is extremely excited to continue his journey beyond his undergraduate pursuits at IPFW and hopes to return in order to earn a Master’s Degree in Educational Administration. He can’t thank his beautiful future wife, his sister, his brothers, his father, his professors, and all of his friends and family enough for the support they’ve given him over the past couple of years.

Abstract

Twenty two years after the collapse of the Somalian government, a functioning nation state has yet to appear in the east African country. Attempts were made early on by the United Nations to end suffering and restore order to the chaotic environment, but these attempts failed to produce lasting effects. This paper discusses the sociopolitical conditions within Somalia, the inability of outside actors to operate in the complex environment, and the lack of political will in the United States to continue the humanitarian mission after setbacks as well as the effect these conditions had on the overall failure that occurred. By compiling several articles that have attempted to explain the failure of the first post-Cold War intervention attempt, as well as survey statistics and news articles, this project synthesizes components of several arguments into three significant explanations. The first argument presented is that the family based social structure of Somalia was too complex an environment for the western powers to operate in, thus the attempts to enforce a western idea of order was failed from its onset. The second argument is that the military and humanitarian forces deployed into Somalia failed to cooperatively function in a way that would have led to a successful mission. The third and final argument this work postulates is the effect political opinion in the US had on the continuation of attempted aid operations as certain events, particularly the October 3, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, unfolded in Somalia. As current and future historians look back on the crisis state that is Somalia, the two decade period of statelessness will be its hallmark. Had the US led attempts by the United Nations proved successful, a vastly different history may have been written in Somalia as well as other African nations that experienced great periods of suffering in the last two decades.

Bibliographical Note
Academic journal articles were the majority of sources cited in this paper for a few reasons. The first reason is that there are not many books that attempt to shed light on the operations of the United Nations in Somalia over the entire course of the intervention attempt. Because most of the events in question occurred within a small time frame approximately twenty years ago and possibly because of the confusing nature of the situation, few over-arching and in-depth attempts have been made by scholars to discern what went wrong in Somalia. At first this seemed detrimental to my research. However, the plurality of viewpoints on the matter provided several possible answers to why intervention failed. Also, connecting the dots in the similarities between those viewpoints created a sense of understanding and provided me with helpful background knowledge as well as a well-supported thesis.