Title

Panpsychism and the Dissolution of Dispositional Properties

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Winter 2010

Publication Source

Southwest Philosophy Review

Volume

24

Issue

2

ISBN/ISSN

08972346

Peer Reviewed

yes

Abstract

The article explains my third argument for panpsychism, based on disolving all properties, including dispositional physical properties like mass, energy, and force, into phenomenal properties. I thus reject a dual-property version of panpsychism. I seek to show, contrary to Paul Churchland, that the general panpsychist hypothesis has some explanatory value, and makes a cosmology consisting in comparative psychology possible. The mental life even of so-called physical particles in physics is hypothesized to help explain their behavior.

Keywords

panpsychism, mind-body problem

Disciplines

Metaphysics | Philosophy | Philosophy of Mind

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