Document Type

Article

Publication Date

7-2010

Publication Source

Southwest Philosophy Review

Volume

26

Issue

2

Inclusive pages

87-108

DOI

DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview201026246

Peer Reviewed

yes

Abstract

The article explains my third argument for panpsychism, based on disolving all properties, including dispositional physical properties like mass, energy, and force, into phenomenal properties. I thus reject a dual-property version of panpsychism. I seek to show, contrary to Paul Churchland, that the general panpsychist hypothesis has some explanatory value, and makes a cosmology consisting in comparative psychology possible. The mental life even of so-called physical particles in physics is hypothesized to help explain their behavior.

Keywords

panpsychism, mind-body problem

Disciplines

Metaphysics | Philosophy | Philosophy of Mind

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